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Abstract 
Gambling is a naturalistic example of risky decision-making. During gambling, players typically 
display an array of cognitive biases that create a distorted expectancy of winning. This study 
investigated brain regions underpinning gambling-related cognitive distortions, contrasting patients 
with focal brain lesions to the ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC), insula or amygdala (‘target 
patients’) against healthy comparison participants and lesion comparison patients (i.e., with lesions 
that spare the target regions). A slot machine task was used to deliver ‘near-miss’ outcomes (i.e. 
non-wins that fall spatially close to a jackpot), and a roulette game was used to examine the 
gambler’s fallacy (color decisions following outcome runs). Comparison groups displayed a 
heightened motivation to play following near-misses (compared to full-misses), and manifested a 
classic gambler’s fallacy effect. Both effects were also observed in patients with vmPFC and 
amygdala damage, but were absent in patients with insula damage. Our findings indicate that the 
distorted cognitive processing of near-miss outcomes and event sequences may be ordinarily 
supported by the recruitment of the insula. Interventions to reduce insula reactivity could show 
promise in the treatment of disordered gambling.  
 
 
Significance Statement 
Gambling games are associated with a distorted psychological processing of random sequences (the 
gambler’s fallacy) and unrewarded outcomes that fall close to a jackpot (near-misses). Problem 
gamblers appear more susceptible to these effects. Here, we show that these two gambling 
distortions are disrupted in patients with brain injury affecting the insula, compared to patients with 
damage to the ventromedial prefrontal cortex or amygdala. In a roulette task (red/black 
predictions), comparison groups chose either color less after longer runs of that color outcome. On a 
slot machine task, comparison groups rated higher motivation following near-misses relative to full-
misses. Our results generate a clinical hypothesis that in disordered gambling, these cognitions may 
be underpinned by excessive recruitment of insula circuitry.  
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Introduction 
 
Gambling is a widespread activity with a lifetime prevalence of 78% in the US (1) and a past-year 
prevalence of 73% in the UK (2). The widespread recognition that ‘the house always wins’, reflecting 
the negative expected value of gambling, makes gambling an enduring puzzle for psychological and 
economic models of choice behavior. Cognitive approaches to gambling explain this non-normative 
behavior with reference to a number of cognitive distortions and irrational beliefs that occur during 
gambling play, which cause the gambler to over-estimate his likelihood of winning (3, 4). The illusion 
of control refers to how superficial features of a game, such as a choice or instrumental response, 
promote erroneous perceptions of skill over outcomes that are determined only by chance (5). Near-
miss outcomes (non-wins that fall close to the jackpot) increase motivations to play, plausibly by 
fuelling beliefs about skill acquisition (6). The gambler’s fallacy is a bias in the processing of 
randomness, whereby recent consecutive outcomes are considered less likely to repeat, and 
conversely, outcomes that have not occurred in the recent history are perceived as ‘due’ (7).  
These distortions are reliably observed in field studies, e.g. casino environments (8), and are 
not confined to gambling; illusory control and the gambler’s fallacy are observed in stock traders (9), 
and near-misses influence decision-making in occupational settings (10). In the laboratory, these 
distortions can be elicited with gambling games, allowing the comparison of these biases between 
different clinical groups. The overall level of distorted thinking is elevated in people with gambling 
problems (11, 12) and these cognitions can be targetted effectively in psychological therapy for 
disordered gambling (13).   
The neurobiological basis of these gambling-related distortions has received little attention 
to date. Functional imaging studies of pathological gambling have focussed largely on abnormalities 
in appetitive processing, reinforcement learning and executive functions (14-17). These studies 
identify dysregulation across an extended brain network (sometimes termed the ‘brain reward 
system’) that includes the ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC), striatum, amygdala and insula. 
However, in these experiments the direction of signal abnormality (i.e. hyperactivity vs hypoactivity) 
is not consistent, and the precise neural signatures are highly task dependent (18). A previous fMRI 
study of a simplified slot machine found that near-misses recruited overlapping neural circuitry to 
the jackpot wins in the ventral striatum and insula, and that insula responses increased with higher 
levels of trait-related susceptibility to gambling distortions (6, 19). Other neuroimaging work has 
indicated sensitivity of insula and medial prefrontal cortex to sequences of consecutive outcomes, 
and subsequent updating of choice strategy (20-22).   
4 
 
The aim of the present study was to investigate brain regions underlying gambling 
distortions, by studying patients with focal brain injury. Unlike functional neuroimaging, this 
neuropsychological approach allows causal inferences to be made concerning the necessary role of 
candidate brain regions in psychological processes (23). We identified cases with focal brain damage 
affecting either the vmPFC, the insula or the amygdala; injury to these regions impairs real-life 
decision-making and emotional behavior (24-26). Furthermore, neuropsychological testing in 
pathological gamblers has identified a profile of impaired risky choice that is highly reminiscent of 
vmPFC damage in particular (27, 28). Given the exaggeration of gambling-related cognitive 
distortions in problem gamblers, an intuitive prediction might be that the lesion groups would show 
an enhanced sensitivity to near-miss outcomes,  illusory control, and gambler’s fallacy. However, the 
alternative prediction is also plausible: given that these non-normative gambling biases also occur in 
healthy participants, in whom they are underpinned by the recruitment of reward-related neural 
circuitry (6, 19, 20), the lesion groups might be immunized against these gambling distortions.  
 
Results 
Patients with lesions affecting the vmPFC (n=17; see Fig S1), insula (n=8; see Fig. 1) and amygdala 
(n=6; see Fig. S2) completed two gambling tasks. A slot machine task (see Fig. 2A) measured the 
sensitivity to near-miss outcomes, and included a manipulation of personal choice that provides a 
measure of the illusion of control. A roulette task (see Fig. 2B) measured the susceptibility to the 
gambler’s fallacy. With the inclusion of multiple lesion subgroups of fairly small sizes, the first stage 
of analysis collapsed the three groups into a pooled ‘target group’ (n=31), for comparison against 
healthy participants (n=16) and a lesion comparison group (n=13; see Fig S3) that comprised a 
mixture of patients with posterior, lateral temporal and superior frontal cortex damage. This 
approach maximises power to detect an effect in regions that are anatomically interconnected, and 
likely to operate as a functional circuit (26). At a second stage of analysis, the target group was 
separated into the constituent subgroups to directly compare the effects of vmPFC, insula and 
amygdala damage, given evidence for differential functional specialisations of these regions (29-31). 
In both analyses, the groups did not differ significantly in terms of age, years of education or sex 
distribution (see Table S1). When asked about their gambling involvement in real life, most 
participants reported “none” or “occasional” involvement; with only two cases (one vmPFC, one 
lesion comparison patient) reporting “regular” gambling. Two lesion patients reported that their 
gambling had increased following their brain injury; both were males in the vmPFC lesion group, and 
one of these was the only participant identified as a probable pathological gambler on a screening 
instrument, the South Oaks Gambling Screen (32) (threshold ≥5; this participant scored 6). There 
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were no group differences on the Gambling Related Cognitions Scale (33), a trait-related measure of 
their beliefs about gambling and susceptibility to gambling biases.  
 
Slot Machine Task  
A simulated two-reel slot machine was used to deliver wins, as well as ‘near miss’ and ‘full miss’ non-
winning outcomes. On half the trials, the participant was asked to select a ‘play icon’ from six 
alternatives on the left reel; on the remaining trials, the play icon was selected automatically by the 
computer. Following this icon selection, the right hand reel spun and slowed to a standstill. If the 
right reel aligned with the selected icon on the left reel, the participant received a hypothetical win 
(“Win $1!”). All other outcomes were designated non-wins (“No win”). On-screen Likert scales were 
presented following icon selection (“Please rate your chances of winning”) and following the 
outcome message  (“How pleased are  you with that result?”; “How much do you want to continue 
the game?”).  
On the ratings of “chances of winning”, all groups manifested a higher expectancy of 
winning when selecting the play icon themselves, compared to when the play icon was selected 
automatically (main effect: F(1,47) = 7.03, p = .011). This influence of personal choice is consistent 
with an illusion of control. The effect did not vary significantly across groups (main effect of Group: 
F(2,47) = 0.49, p = .613; Group x Choice interaction F(2,47) = 1.00, p = .377) (see Table S2). 
  Comparing the subjective ratings following winning outcomes against all non-win outcomes, 
the wins were rated as more pleasant (F(1,45) = 90.3, p < .001) and there was a significant Group x 
Outcome interaction (F(2,45) = 4.32, p = .019). Win responsivity was blunted in the lesion 
comparison group (∆ = 45.5. SD = 56.8) compared to the target group (∆ = 108.3, SD = 53.9, p = .005) 
and the healthy participants (∆ = 87.5, SD = 54.2, p = .071), who did not differ (p = .247) (see Fig. S4). 
Pleasantness ratings did not vary as a function of personal choice (F(1,45) = 1.66, p = .204). Wins also 
increased the motivation to continue (F(1,43) = 11.4, p = .002), and this effect did not vary across 
groups (F(2,43) = 0.64, p = .532) or as a function of personal choice (F(1,43) = 0.68, p = .413).  
The next set of tests compared the near-misses against the full-misses; both non-win 
outcomes that are objectively equivalent. On the motivation rating, a statistically reliable Outcome x 
Control interaction was seen (F(1,43) = 6.03, p = .018) (see Fig. 3A). Consistent with past 
observations with this task, the interaction was driven by the participant-chosen trials, on which 
near-misses tended to increase the motivation to continue playing (M = 45.2, SD = 29.2) compared 
to full-misses (M = 43.6, SD = 29.9), although this effect was marginally significant (t45 = 1.69, p = 
.10). On trials without personal control, near-misses and full-misses did not differ (t45 = 0.76, p = 
.453). In addition, there was a significant Outcome x Group interaction (F(2,43) = 3.69, p = .033) such 
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that the motivational effect of near-misses was attenuated in the target group (∆ = -0.70, SD = 3.51) 
compared to healthy participants (∆ = 1.91, SD = 3.01; p = .019) and the lesion comparison group (∆ 
= 1.92, SD = 2.81; p = .068). There were no significant effects in the equivalent model for 
pleasantness ratings. 
Subdividing the target group into the vmPFC, insula and amygdala subgroups, the overall 
task sensitivities were similar to the first model: the perceived chances of winning was higher on 
personal choice trials, and winning outcomes were rated as more pleasant and increased the 
motivation to continue the game. An additional effect was a further manifestation of the illusion of 
control: an Outcome x Choice interaction was observed on the pleasantness ratings following wins 
compared to non-wins (F(1,20) = 12.1, p = .002), such that participant-chosen wins were rated as 
more pleasant (M = 69.9, SD = 31.5) than computer-chosen wins (M = 61.1, SD = 33.5) (t22 = 2.87, p = 
.009). This effect did not vary across groups (F(2,20) = 0.402, p = .674). Critically, the motivational 
ratings to near-misses compared to full-misses revealed a further dissociation between the three 
lesion sites (Outcome x Group interaction: F(2,21) = 3.47, p = .050). The insula group showed a 
smaller (and in fact inverted) motivational response to near-misses (minus full-misses: ∆ = -3.2, SD = 
3.6) compared to the amygdala group (∆ = +1.4, SD = 2.1) (p = .018) (see Fig. 3B). The insula group 
also differed at trend from the vmPFC group (∆ = -0.3, SD = 3.4) (p = .074).  
 
Roulette Task  
Participants played 90 successive trials on a binary-choice roulette task. The roulette wheel 
displayed an equal number of red and blue segments, and on each trial, the participant first guessed 
‘red’ or ‘blue’, and then gave a confidence rating on 21-point visual analogue scale. After these two 
responses, the wheel spun briefly and the outcome was displayed for that trial. Consecutive 
outcomes of the same color are referred to as “runs” (i.e. blue, red, red, red is an outcome run of 
length 3), and consecutive correct or incorrect predictions are referred to as “streaks”.  
To quantify the gambler’s fallacy, we calculated the probability of choosing either color as a 
function of the run length of that color (7). In a model comparing the target group, lesion 
comparison group, and healthy participants, there was a strong main effect of run length (F(4,200) = 
8.83, p < .001), with decreasing choice of either color after longer runs of that color. This gambler’s 
fallacy effect did not vary across groups (main effect of Group: F(2,50) = 1.14, p = .327; Group x Run 
Length interaction F(8,200) = 0.56, p = .728) (see Fig. 4A). 
Comparing the subgroups of target patients (15 vmPFC, 6 insula, 6 amygdala), the analysis of 
color choice again showed the main effect of Run Length (F(4,96) = 3.55, p = .010), as well as a 
significant Group x Run Length interaction (F(8,96) = 2.14, p = .039). Calculating a change score 
7 
 
based on the difference between shorter run lengths (1 and 2) and longer run lengths (3, 4 and 5), 
the insula group showed positive recency on average (∆ = -0.09, SD = 0.18), differing significantly 
from the vmPFC group (∆ = 0.14, SD = 0.16) (p = .005) and the amygdala group (∆ = 0.16, SD = 0.14) 
(p = .012) who did not differ in expression of the typical gambler’s fallacy (p = .831) (see Fig. 4B).  
We also examined confidence ratings on the roulette game, as a function of winning and 
losing streaks. Comparing the target group against the lesion comparison group and healthy 
participants, subjective confidence did not vary significantly as a function of either winning streak 
length (F(4,184) = 0.25, p = .833) or losing streak length (F(4,184) = 1.61, p = .192). As such, there 
was no discernible ‘hot hand’ effect in our data (7) (although see also Table S3). The effects of streak 
length did not interact significantly with group status (all F < 1.39, p > .259), and there were no 
additional effects within the target group. Several additional metrics were derived to characterize 
choice behavior on the roulette task. There were no differences between groups in the overall 
choice of red vs blue, or the ‘stickiness’ of choice according to either the previous choice or the 
previous outcome  (see Table S4). We computed variables reflecting win-stay and lose-shift biases; 
there was a significant difference between the target group, lesion comparison group and healthy 
participants in the lose-shift score (F(2,50) = 3.25, p = .047) but not the win-stay score (F(2,50) = 
0.39, p = .679). Target patients were more likely to switch color choice following an unsuccessful 
prediction than healthy controls (p = .023), but this tendency did not vary significantly between the 
vmPFC, insula and amygdala subgroups (F(2,24) = 0.362, p = .700). 
 
Discussion 
The key effect described here is that a group of patients with stable brain injury affecting the insula 
region show a marked attenuation of two cognitive distortions that were elicited in healthy 
participants and patients with lesions to other structures, and which can be widely observed during 
naturalistic gambling across various games. On the slot machine task, near-miss outcomes (where 
the reel stopped one position from a win) typically increase the self-reported motivation to continue 
with the game (6, 34); this effect was selectively absent in the insula group. On the roulette task, 
binary choice displayed a classic negative recency, where the choice of either color decreased as a 
function of the preceding run of that color (7); the insula group did not manifest this avoidance of 
recent outcomes. These data provide the first evidence for the causal involvement of the insula 
region in some of the cognitions characteristic of gambling behavior.  
The roulette task used here was simple guessing game, tapping strategic decision-making 
that may be modulated – erroneously – by the recent outcome history. Here, insula patients 
distributed their choices between the two color options, and showed no apparent differences in 
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basic ‘stickiness’ or self-reported confidence, but they deviated from the other groups in that they 
did not show a gambler’s fallacy bias. An intriguing feature is that the averaged data for the insula 
group displayed modest positive recency in their roulette color choice (Fig. 4B). On the slot machine 
task, near-misses were similarly observed to be de-motivating (Fig. 3B). This apparent inversion 
implies some systematic tendency in the insula patients, but based on an alternative model of the 
task contingencies (and supported by different regions of the decision-making network). In a 
probabilistic environment, it is beneficial to select recently-reinforced options, and a recent fMRI 
study indicated that dorsal striatal responses track reinforcement learning parameters in such a task 
(35). Other work highlights involvement of dorsolateral prefrontal cortex in detecting pattern 
violations (36) and switching responding after longer runs (37). One relevant procedural difference 
in the ‘matched pennies’ task used by Xue et al (37) is that a history bar was presented, showing 
participants the recent outcomes. After long runs of the same outcome, the history bar may serve as 
a direct cue to switch, thus lessening any reliance on participants’ internal model of the task. Further 
behavioral work could usefully compare strategic choice in the presence or absence of such cues for 
the reinforcement history. 
In light of evidence that gambling cognitions are increased in disordered gambling (11, 13), 
these data generate a testable hypothesis that over-recruitment of insula circuitry may underlie 
gambling-related cognitive distortions. In fact, functional neuroimaging provides some support for 
this idea. In healthy participants, insula responsivity to near-miss outcomes correlated positively 
with their trait susceptibility to gambling distortions on a self-report scale (6, 38). Using a monetary 
incentive delay task in treatment-seeking pathological gamblers, over-activity of anterior insula 
during loss anticipation was correlated with gambling severity scores (39). These effects may be 
mediated by the established role of the insula in the representation of bodily states, i.e. 
interoception (40). Certainly, gambling is an intensely exciting, visceral activity, and near-misses 
were previously shown to induce physiological changes in skin conductance and heart rate (34, 41). 
One could hypothesize that the central processing of these peripheral signals is abolished by insula 
damage. Via a similar mechanism, insula activity has been linked to drug craving, such that smokers 
who suffered infarcts to the insula region quit smoking and described an abolition of the urge to 
smoke (42). Animal models have corroborated these effects of insula damage on drug self-
administration, with lesions centred on posterior, granula insula (43, 44). Therapeutic strategies to 
reduce insula responsivity, such as mindfulness- or meditation-based techniques (45, 46) or GABA-
ergic medications (47), may usefully augment cognitive therapy for psychological distortions in the 
treatment of problem gambling.  
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In addition to its interoceptive functions, the insula is increasingly thought to play a critical 
role in decision-making under uncerainty. fMRI studies indicate heightened insula signal following 
outcomes from risky decisions, and these responses vary across subjects as a function of risk-taking 
propensities (22, 48, 49). Anterior insula appears to represent risk predictions during choice, and risk 
prediction errors in response to decision outcomes (50). Such predictions about the uncertainty of 
the environment are relevant to both the near-miss effect (51) and gambler’s fallacy (35), and 
arguably less relevant to the illusion of control effect that did not vary across lesion groups here. 
Past work in cases with insula lesions has shown increases in risk-taking and impaired discrimination 
between risky gains and risky losses (31, 52). Using an investment task in which most participants 
are loss averse, patients with brain injury to either vmPFC, insula or amygdala achieved higher 
profits (26), and these effects were strongest in the insula subgroup (n=4), who also failed to modify 
their investment behavior as a function of prior outcome (i.e. losses vs wins) – an effect that 
resembles the abolition of the gambler’s fallacy (Table S5 also displays an analogous effect in icon 
selection on the slot machine task). While the target group in the present study showed a greater 
lose-shift tendency on the roulette task, this effect did not vary across groups (and was numerically 
weakest in the insula subgroup), and thus seems unlikely to contribute to their positive recency 
across successive red or black outcomes.  
At the current time, it is not known whether the insula involvement in decision-making and 
risky choice is dissociable from its interoceptive functions. While an integrative model has been 
proposed that anterior insula represents predictions of both internal states and decision uncertainty 
(53), other work highlights functional segregation within the insula, in which decision-making 
localises to the anterior, agranular insula adjacent to the orbitofrontal region, and visceral 
representations may be located more posteriorly (54, 55). Neuropsychological studies in stroke cases 
lack the specificity to resolve anterior – posterior insula effects, but we note that the insula lesion 
overlap in the present study was located posteriorly.  
In the patients with injury to the vmPFC and amygdala, the effects of near-misses and the 
gambler’s fallacy were comparable to those of participants in the healthy and lesion comparison 
groups. Data from neuropsychological testing and functional neuroimaging in pathological gamblers 
provide much evidence for disruption of the vmPFC and orbitofrontal cortex (16, 27, 28, 56), as well 
as preliminary evidence for amygdala involvement in loss aversion (57) and gain expectancies (17). 
Nevertheless, our data do not support the involvement of these regions in either the near-miss 
effect or gambler’s fallacy. Concerning the lack of effect in the vmPFC lesion group, it may be 
pertinent that neither of our gambling tasks loaded heavily on risk-taking or representations of 
expected value (31, 58). Rather, the slot machine task primarily measured emotional reactivity. Past 
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studies have also found no effects of vmPFC lesions on the responses to obtained financial gains 
(59), mood induction (60) or emotional images, providing attentional engagement is adequate (61). 
We did observe some diminution of win responsivity in the lesion comparison group on pleasantness 
ratings. Given that this effect was not predicted, and the heterogeneous nature of the damage in the 
lesion comparison group, this effect is treated with caution.  
Some further observations require additional testing to fully resolve. In our insula group, 
damage extended into the dorsal part of the basal ganglia in some patients. Single case analysis (see 
Table S6) indicated that these patients were most disrupted on the two distortions, but  also showed 
that some attenuation was clearly present in the insula cases with no striatal involvement. Larger 
studies are needed to resolve the functional dissociations between insula and (dorsal) striatum (62). 
It could be reasoned that striatally-mediated effects should also interfere with win processing and 
the personal choice manipulation (63, 64), which was not the case. Lastly, the disruption of both the 
near-miss effect and the gambler’s fallacy in the insula cases implies some linkage of these two 
gambling distortions, raising a broader question of how the various gambling-related cognitive 
distortions should be organised at a psychological or neural level. In conclusion, we provide 
neuropsychological evidence for the causal involvement of the insula in two gambling-related 
cognitive distortions, generating a testable hypothesis of insula over-activity in disordered gambling.  
 
Materials and Methods 
 
Participants. Neurological patients were recruited from the Patient Registry in the Department of 
Neurology at the University of Iowa. All patients had focal, stable lesions that were predominantly 
adult-onset, and all sustained at least one year prior to testing. All of the lesion cases have 
undergone extensive screening and neuropsychological evaluation that rule out dementia and 
diffuse cognitive deficits, and these measures have been presented in prior studies (24, 30, 31, 52). 
Exclusion criteria were a history of mental retardation, learning disability, or psychiatric illness 
including substance abuse. Patients were selected for eligibility on the basis of neuroanatomical 
status obtained from MRI or CT scanning (see below). For the vmPFC group (see Fig. S1), the 
criterion for inclusion was damage in the unilateral or bilateral portions of the mesial orbital/ 
ventromedial sector of the prefrontal cortex and/or the frontal pole. None of the vmPFC group had 
damage involving the amygdala or the insular cortex. Lesion aetiology in the vmPFC group was 
haemorrhage due to ruptured aneurysm of the anterior communicating artery or benign tumour 
resections, and the group including a mixture of bilateral (n=12), right unilateral (n=3) and left 
unilateral (n=2) lesions.  
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In the insula lesion group (see Fig. 1), the lesion involved damage to any part of the insular 
cortex (anterior and/or posterior) and/or the adjacent secondary somatosensory cortex (SII). In the 
insula group, lesion aetiology was a middle cerebral artery stroke in all cases, and all lesions were 
unilateral (left n=4, right n=4). In individual cases, some lesions extended medially into the edge of 
the basal ganglia (internal capsule and possible putamen) (see Table S6 for single case analysis), 
laterally into superior temporal lobe, posteriorly into the inferior parietal cortex, and anteriorly into 
the inferior frontal gyrus. None of the cases had damage that reached the medial temporal lobe or 
the medial prefrontal cortex. 
In the amygdala lesion group (see Figure S2), the lesion involved selective bilateral damage 
to the amygdala in one case (due to Urbach-Wiethe disease), or unilateral left-sided damage in the 
other 5 cases. In the unilateral cases, lesion aetiology was surgical resection to treat 
pharmacoresistent epilepsy, and the damage included the amygdala but extended to adjacent 
regions of the hippocampus, parahippocampal gyrus, and entorhinal cortex. None of the cases had 
damage that reached the insula or the medial prefrontal cortex. 
The lesion comparison group (see Fig. S3) involved brain damage sparing the target brain 
regions described above, i.e. the lesion did not include any insula, amygdala or mesial orbital/ 
ventromedial prefrontal cortex. These cases had unilateral damage that was mostly due to strokes 
and a few benign tumour resections.  
A further 16 healthy participants were recruited through community advertising. The study 
was approved by the human subjects committee at the University of Iowa.  Before enrolment in the 
study, written informed consent was acquired in accordance with the Declaration of Helsinki. 
Participants were testing in quiet laboratory conditions. In addition to the two gambling tasks (see 
below), participants completed the South Oaks Gambling Screen (32), a self-report symptom 
checklist for pathological gambling, and the Gambling-Related Cognitions Scale (33), a 24-item 
questionnaire assessing trait susceptibility to gambling cognitions.  
 
Neuroanatomical Analysis. Lesion location was generally confirmed using Magnetic Resonance 
Imaging (MRI), with a 1.5T General Electric scanner with a spin gradient sequence, in 1.5mm 
contiguous T1 weighted coronal slices. MRI scanning was not available in every case (see 
corresponding figure legends); for those cases, a computerized axial tomography (CT) scan was 
acquired instead using either a Picker 1200 or Toshiba Express SX scanner, with tilt angle optimised 
per subject to avoid clip-related artefact (zoom 2.4, field of view 51cm, fovea 212.5mm, slice 
thickness 2-4mm). For all mappable lesions, the lesions of individual patients were transferred 
manually onto a normal reference brain using the MAP-3 technique (65).  
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Slot Machine Task. Participants completed 60 trials (following 4 practice trials) on a simplified  two-
reel slot machine task, described in detail in Clark et al. (6). The screen background colour (white or 
black) designated two choice conditions: either participant-chosen trials, in which the participant 
selected the ‘play icon’ on the left reel by scrolling the reel up or down, and computer-chosen trials, 
in which the play icon was selected automatically. Following icon selection, the right reel spun and 
decelerated (mean spin time: 4.2 s) to deliver a win ($1), near-miss, or full-miss outcome (outcome 
duration 6 s). Current earnings were displayed in the inter-trial interval (duration 5 s); instructions 
specified that the participant was playing for ‘pretend money’. The outcomes and choice condition 
(participant-chosen, computer-chosen) occurred in a fixed pseudo-random sequence such that wins 
occurred on 1/6, and near-misses on 1/3 trials. On each trial, three Likert ratings were taken: 
following icon selection, “How do you rate your chances of winning?” (0 to +100), and following the 
outcome, “How pleased are you with the result?” (-100 to +100) and “How much do you want to 
continue to play?” (0 to +100).  
 
Roulette Task. This binary choice task was modified from (7). The roulette wheel displayed an equal 
number of red and blue segments, and on each trial, the participant first guessed red or blue, and 
then gave a confidence rating on 21-point scale. Following the colour choice and confidence rating, 
the wheel spun for 800-1200ms, and the outcome was presented (e.g. “Blue: you win”). Participants 
completed 3 practice trials, followed by a total of 90 trials, using a pre-specified colour sequence in 
order to deliver runs of 1-5 consecutive outcomes of the same colour. This fixed sequence had an 
equal probability of either colour, and a probability of alternation of 0.48.  
 
Statistical Analysis. Some patients could not be tested on all measures (see Table S1), and there are 
further exclusions on the 2 tasks for participants who did not vary their ratings at all (on the slot 
machine task), or did not vary their choice behaviour sufficiently on the roulette game (>95% to 
either red or black). Although such uniform responding is a reasonable approach that does not 
violate the rules of either task, these cases would be inherently insensitive to the distortions of 
interest here. ANOVA models used the Greenhouse-Geisser correction, with two-tailed p<.05. Post-
hoc comparisons were tested using Least Significant Differences, as is appropriate for 3-group 
designs (66). 
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Figure Legends 
 
Figure 1. Lesion overlap in the insula lesion group. On the coronal slices, the radiological convention 
(right=left) is applied. Warmer colors represent greater lesion overlap across patients. Seven of the 8 
patients had lesions that were mappable from MRI scans; one further patient had a CT scan that was 
not of sufficient quality for lesion mapping, but clinically inspected for verification of lesion location 
in the insula. In the right sided patients, there is maximal lesion overlap in the insula and SII area in 
all 4 patients (red). In the left sided patients, the overlap in the 3 mappable cases (yellow) is in the 
insula, but is relatively small because damage in one patient was focussed on the anterior insula.  
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Figure 2: Graphical illustration of the two gambling simulations: A) The slot machine task was used to 
measures the effects of near miss outcomes (shown) on post-outcome ratings. B) The roulette task 
involved red / blue color choices, to measure the gambler’s fallacy. 
 
 
 Figure 3: Motivational ratings of near
for participant-chosen and computer
healthy participants, B) Change scores (Δ) for the motivational ratings after near
misses) for the target subgroups. Error bars indicate standard error of the mean. 
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 Figure 4: Choice behavior on the rou
participants, and B) Subdividing the target group to display the insula, vmPFC and amygdala lesion 
patients. The ordinate presents the proportion of trials on which the participant’s color ch
matched the outcome of the previous spin. 
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Supporting Information 
Figure S1. Lesion overlap in the vmPFC lesion group, in views of the lateral and medial surfaces (top 
row), and in coronal sections (bottom row) with slices taken at each of the lines shown on the brain 
surfaces in the top row. On the coronal slices, the radiological convention (right=left) is applied. All 
17 vmPFC lesion patients had mappable scans. Warmer colors represent greater lesion overlap 
across patients, with maximal overlap (red, across all 17 cases) in the mesial orbital / ventromedial 
sector of prefrontal cortex and frontal pole. In one case (blue), the lesion is broader, extending 
posteriorly into the anterior cingulate and basal forebrain, and superiorly into the superior frontal 
gyrus. None of the lesions include the insula or the medial temporal lobe. 
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Figure S2: Lesion overlap in the amygdala lesion group, in views of the left and right lateral surfaces 
(top row), and in coronal sections (bottom row) with slices taken at each of the lines shown on the 
brain surfaces in the top row. On the coronal slices, the radiological convention (right=left) is 
applied. All 6 amygdala patients had MRI scans that were mappable. One case had a selective 
bilateral lesion (n=1) in the amygdala due to Urbath-Wiethe disease; the other cases had unilateral 
left-sided lesions (n=5). There is maximal lesion overlap (reflected by red color followed by a 
yellowish and green color) across the group in the left amygdala, which extending to adjacent 
sectors of temporal lobe in the unilateral cases (the blue color). None of the cases had lesions 
involving the insula or the vmPFC.  
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Figure S3: Lesion overlap in the lesion comparison group, in views of the lateral and medial surfaces 
(top row), and in coronal sections (bottom row) with slices taken at each of the lines shown on the 
brain surfaces in the top row. On the coronal slices, the radiological convention (right=left) is 
applied. Only 6 out of the 13 lesion control patients had mappable scans; the remaining 7 patients 
had CT scans that were clinically verified for lesions excluding the target areas, but did not undergo 
the high resolution MRI scan to allow lesion mapping. The lesions in the mappable group were 
variable with some areas of overlap as reflected in yellowish color (overlap of 3 lesions) and cyan 
color (overlap of 2 lesions). The lesions were primarily in the occipital region of the brain, with some 
extending into the inferior occipitotemporal region. Most importantly, none of the lesions had 
damage in any of the target areas: the vmPFC, insular cortex, or amygdala.  
  
 Figure S4: Hedonic ratings (“How pleased are you with the result?”
comparison group and healthy participants, following wins compared to 
outcomes on the slot machine task,
chosen trials. 
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Table S1. Demographic and neurological characteristics of the groups (Mean (S.D.)) 
 
 Healthy Target Lesion Comp.  
N 16 31 13  
Age 60.1 (9.8) 51.9 (15.3) 51.9 (19.5) F=1.71, p=0.19 
Gender (F:M) 6:10 12:19 5:8 χ2=.007, p=0.99 
Education 14.7 (2.3) 14.1 (3.2) 14.4 (2.7) F=0.23, p=0.80 
Lesion Side (B:L:R) -- 13:11:7 2:7:4 χ2=2.9, p=0.24 
Real-life gambling  6:10:0 19:8:1 4:3:1 χ2=6.8, p=0.15 
SOGS† 0.8 (1.4) 0.4 (1.2) 0.4 (0.7) F=0.44, p=0.65 
GRCS† 44.8 (16.1) 41.9 (24.4) 34.6 (15.6) F=0.70, p=0.50 
 vmPFC Insula Amygdala  
N 17 8 6  
Age 52.1 (16.8) 53.3 (16.8) 49.7 (9.9) F=0.09, p=0.91 
Gender (F:M) 6:11 3:5 3:3 χ2=0.41, p=0.81 
Education 14.2 (2.5) 13.8 (4.7) 14.2 (3.1) F=0.06, p=0.94 
Lesion Side (B:L:R) 13:2:3 0:4:4 1:5:0 χ2=18.8, p=.001 
Real-life gambling  8:5:1 6:2:0 5:1:0 χ2=2.1, p=.72 
SOGS 0.8 (1.6) 0.0 (0.0) 0.2 (0.4) F=1.38, p=0.27 
GRCS 48.4 (31.1) 36.6 (14.2) 33.0 (9.6) F=1.07, p=0.36 
 
† South Oaks Gambling Screen (SOGS), Gambling Related Cognitive Scale (GRCS) scores and real-life 
gambling involvement (0=none, 1=occ, 2=reg) were unavailable for 9 lesion participants, giving 
reduced degrees of freedom (2,49) in the ANOVA. B:L:R = bilateral, left-sided, right-sided. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
25 
 
Table S2: Subjective ratings on the slot machine task (mean (SD)) 
 
  Healthy Subjects Target Group Lesion 
Comparison 
“How do you rate your chances of winning?” (0=very low, 100=very high) 
 Participant 35.7 (21.3) 40.7 (22.9) 30.8 (18.5) 
 Computer 32.5 (20.1) 34.6 (21.0) 29.1 (19.1) 
“How pleased are you with the result?” (-100=very unhappy, 0=neutral, +100=very happy) 
Wins  Participant 58.9 (31.6) 69.9 (31.5) 28.9 (37.7) 
 Computer 51.6 (32.0) 61.1 (33.5) 32.7 (49.8) 
Near-misses Participant -32.1 (33.8) -44.4 (30.2) -14.2 (15.2) 
 Computer -32.1 (34.3) -42.3 (34.1) -14.7 (19.6) 
Full-misses Participant -30.8 (34.1) -46.0 (31.6) -12.2 (16.6) 
 Computer -33.8 (36.4) -38.9 (33.0) -17.8 (17.2) 
“How much do you want to continue to play?” (0=not at all, +100=a lot) 
Wins  Participant 64.4 (28.2) 57.8 (29.0) 38.4 (40.5) 
 Computer 62.4 (26.9) 55.6 (30.2) 38.0 (40.9) 
Near-misses Participant 53.5 (28.8) 42.3 (27.1) 37.3 (37.0) 
 Computer 52.2 (30.7) 42.7 (28.7) 31.5 (38.8) 
Full-misses Participant 50.3 (29.8) 43.0 (27.7) 31.3 (37.6) 
 Computer 51.6 (29.9) 43.5 (27.8) 33.6 (37.4) 
     
  vmPFC Insula Amygdala 
“How do you rate your chances of winning?” (0=very low, 100=very high) 
 Participant 33.8 (23.4) 53.6 (16.2) 40.6 (23.6) 
 Computer 29.9 (22.9) 40.1 (14.3) 38.3 (24.2) 
“How pleased are you with the result?” (-100=very unhappy, 0=neutral, +100=very happy) 
Wins  Participant 60.8 (31.7) 74.9 (32.1) 79.3 (32.0) 
 Computer 52.6 (30.7) 71.9 (38.2) 62.3 (34.2) 
Near-misses Participant -49.0 (28.3) -41.2 (31.3) -40.5 (36.3) 
 Computer -51.1 (34.9) -29.8 (29.6) -42.2 (38.9) 
Full-misses Participant -47.9 (31.5) -43.7 (32.0) -45.6 (36.9) 
 Computer -42.3 (34.4) -33.6 (32.0) -39.1 (37.1) 
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“How much do you want to continue to play?” (0=not at all, +100=a lot) 
Wins  Participant 53.2 (29.1) 68.0 (36.4) 54.3 (19.6) 
 Computer 51.8 (27.6) 63.0 (40.6) 54.0 (24.1) 
Near-misses Participant 39.6 (24.5) 49.0 (35.4) 39.5 (24.8) 
 Computer 39.5 (27.5) 50.3 (35.4) 39.8 (25.5) 
Full-misses Participant 39.1 (27.0) 53.4 (31.9) 37.8 (25.1) 
 Computer 40.5 (26.4) 52.2 (35.0) 38.7 (23.3) 
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 Table S3: Effects of feedback streaks on confidence ratings on the roulette game (mean (SD)) 
 
 Healthy Subjects Target Group Lesion Comparison 
Short Win Streak 0.03 (0.21) -0.03 (0.17) -0.01 (0.12) 
Long Win Streak 0.03 (0.68) 0.06 (0.35) -0.19 (0.50) 
Short Loss Streak -0.03 (0.24) 0.01 (0.15) 0.00 (0.17) 
Long Loss Streak 0.22 (0.35) 0.10 (0.61) 0.11 (0.31) 
    
 vmPFC Insula Amygdala 
Short Win Streak -0.04 (0.21) -0.03 (0.17) 0.00 (0.06) 
Long Win Streak 0.03 (0.31) 0.22 (0.35) -0.06 (0.42) 
Short Loss Streak 0.00 (0.12) 0.00 (0.19) 0.06 (0.19) 
Long Loss Streak 0.26 (0.63) -0.34 (0.48) 0.19 (0.55) 
 
Confidence ratings were taken on a scale from 1-21 ‘How confident are you in your decision?’ with 
poles labelled ‘No confidence’ to ‘High confidence’. Raw ratings were then z standardized for each 
participant based on their distribution (mean and standard deviation) of ratings.  
In the primary ANOVA model with streak length as a 5-level repeated-measures factor, there were 
no statistically-reliable main effects of winning or losing streaks, Group status, or Group by Streak 
Length interactions (see main text). However, aggregating the streaks into shorter (1 and 2 length) 
vs. longer (3, 4 and 5 length) streaks, there was a main effect of Loss Streak length (F(1,46) = 3.62, p 
= .063), such that participants were more confident following several consecutive losses. This is 
presumably a further manifestation of the Gambler’s Fallacy,  i.e. their over-confidence is linked to 
their prediction that the other outcome is ‘due’. In the aggregated models, there were no effects of 
Group status or Group by Streak Length interactions.
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 Table S4: Roulette task: further choice and strategy metrics (mean (SD)) 
 
 Healthy Subjects Target Group Lesion 
Comparison 
 
P (red) 0.58 (0.14) 0.49 (0.11) 0.53 (0.14) F=2.6, p=.086 
P (same as previous 
outcome) 
0.42 (0.14) 0.53 (0.18) 0.49 (0.12) F=2.2, p=.120 
P (same as previous 
choice) 
0.63 (0.13) 0.56 (0.13) 0.64 (0.13) F=1.9, p=.164 
P (win-stay) 0.55 (0.19) 0.60 (0.21) 0.62 (0.18) F=0.4, p=.679 
P (lose-shift) 0.31 (0.18) 0.47 (0.24) 0.35 (0.16) F=3.3, p=.047 
     
 vmPFC Insula Amygdala  
P (red) 0.51 (0.09) 0.47 (0.18) 0.47 (0.06) F=0.5, p=.620 
P (same as previous 
outcome) 
0.51 (0.16) 0.54 (0.24) 0.58 (0.20) F=0.3, p=.745 
P (same as previous 
choice) 
0.54 (0.13) 0.65 (0.15) 0.54 (0.12) F=1.5, p=.243 
P (win-stay) 0.55 (0.17) 0.70 (0.32) 0.62 (0.19) F=1.1, p=.352 
P (lose-shift) 0.47 (0.24) 0.40 (0.26) 0.53 (0.27) F=0.4, p=.700 
 
The two metrics, P(same as previous outcome) and P(same as previous choice), were calculated from 
trials 2-90 in the sequence. P(same as previous outcome) describes the tendency (i.e. proportion of 
trials) of red choices if the last roulette spin landed on red, or blue choices where the last spin 
landed on blue. The gambler’s fallacy is a specific instance of this category, as a function of the 
number of consecutive identical outcomes. In contrast, P(same as previous choice) describes the 
tendency to repeat one’s prior choice: the proportion of trials where one chooses red having chosen 
red on the previous trial (or chooses blue having chosen blue on the previous trial). It is evident that 
the mean values for this ‘choice stickiness’ are above 0.5 and somewhat higher than the values for 
‘outcome stickiness’. Choice stickiness further informs the metrics for win-stay and lose-shift. P (win-
stay) is the proportion of trials after a correct prediction where one chooses the same colour as the 
previous choice. P (lose shift)  is the proportion of trials after an incorrect prediction where one 
chooses the opposite colour to the previous choice. 
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Table S5: Icon selections on the slot machine task (mean (SD)). On participant-chosen trials, how 
likely were participants to choose the same icon as the previous trial, as a function of the outcome 
on the previous trial? 
 
 Healthy Subjects Target Group Lesion Comparison 
% reselection after a…    
   Win 18.1 (12.8) 20.3 (15.5) 27.8 (20.9) 
   Near Miss 25.6 (12.2) 23.7 (11.7) 22.9 (13.6) 
   Full Miss 27.9 (10.9) 22.9 (13.6) 34.2 (12.9) 
    
 vmPFC Insula Amygdala 
% reselection after a…    
   Win 16.9 (12.5) 27.0 (18.6) 20.0 (17.9) 
   Near Miss 22.7 (14.4) 25.7 (7.9) 23.3 (10.3) 
   Full Miss 31.5 (17.6) 22.2 (14.2) 28.9 (19.2) 
 
In the first model (healthy subjects vs target group vs lesion comparison), there was a main effect of 
Outcome (F(2,98) = 5.10, p = .018), such that participants tended to avoid reselecting the same icon 
following wins, and following near-misses, compared to full-misses (p = .009 and p = .002, 
respectively). This is likely to reflect a further manifestation of the gambler’s fallacy (see L Clark et al. 
2013 Journal of Behavioral Decision Making). There was no main effect of Group or Group x 
Outcome interaction. In the second model (vmPFC vs insula vs amygdala), there were no significant 
effects in the ANOVA model, although the effect in healthy subjects was also visually apparent in the 
vmPFC and amygdala groups, but not within the insula cases. 
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Table S6: Insula Group – single case analysis by striatal involvement. (mean (SD)) 
 
 Striatal  Involvement? Near Miss Gambler’s Fallacy 
Healthy Subjects N/A 1.91 (3.01) 0.08 (0.21) 
Lesion Comparison Group N/A 1.92 (2.81) 0.14 (0.21) 
Insula Cases    
1  N 
b a 
2 Y -3.9 -0.07 
3  Y -4.9 -0.36 
4  N -1.0 0.06 
5  Y -9.8 -0.18 
6  Y -1.4 b 
7  N -2.5 0.14 
8  N 1.4 -0.12 
 
a Selected >95% from one colour, allowing no further analysis of choice strategies on the roulette 
task. b Task not completed. 
On the near-miss summary variable, the mean score for insula cases with striatal involvement was -
5.0 (SD = 3.5), and the mean for cases without striatal damage was -0.7 (SD = 2.0). On the gambler’s 
fallacy summary variable, the mean score for insula cases with striatal involvement was -0.20 (SD = 
0.15), and without was 0.02 (SD = 0.13).Thus, while both effects are stronger in the cases where 
damage encroaching into the striatum, it is equally clear that the normative effects in the two 
comparison groups are nevertheless attenuated in the insula cases with no striatal involvement. 
  
